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WINKELMAN V. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT.
A MAJOR VICTORY FOR PARENTS OR MORE AMBIGUITY?
Patricia C. Hagdorn*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Winkelman v. Parma City School District,1 the Supreme Court of
the United States was poised to determine "whether, and if so, under
what circumstances, non-lawyer parents of a disabled child may pros-
ecute an Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) [2] ...
case pro se in federal court., 3 IDEA is a federal statute that guaran-
tees over 6.8 million children with disabilities4 the right to a "free ap-
propriate public education" (FAPE).' The Judiciary Act of 1789 pro-
vides that individuals granted a private right of action under a federal
statute, such as IDEA, may represent themselves pro se or hire an at-
torney.6 However, individuals proceeding pro se may only represent
their rights. 7 Since IDEA grants rights to children and children are
unable to adequately represent themselves pro se, children must ob-
tain a lawyer to vindicate their rights.8
* J.D., 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2004, Drew University. I
sincerely thank Professor Thomas Healy for his excellent guidance, unwavering sup-
port, and critical advice in writing this Comment. I would also like to thank Jamie
Gottlieb for her excellent advice and incredible assistance in editing my Comment.
This Comment is dedicated to the students in class 1-146, SSB, and to all children
who strive to reach their full academic potential.
I Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
2 Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
3 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at i, Winkelman, 550 U.S. 516 (No. 05-983).
4 Data Accountability Center, Data Tables for OSEP State Reported Data: IDEA
Part B Child Count (2005),tbl. 1-1, http://www.ideadata.org/tables29th/arl-1.htm.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (A).
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2000).
7 Id.
8 FED. R. Crv. P. 17(c); see also Chase v. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51, No.
07-cv-00205-REB-BNB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72485 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2007) (hold-
ing that a parent does not have standing to represent his or her minor son in IDEA
action because Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1994) preclude a minor
child from bringing suit through a parent acting as next of friend, if that parent does
not have an attorney).
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However, many families of children with disabilities do not have
the financial resources to retain a special education attorney.9 There-
fore, parents have tried to prosecute IDEA claims pro se.' ° While
courts have allowed attorney-parents to prosecute the claims of their
children, they have precluded lay parents from prosecuting IDEA
claims. Thus, the discrete question presented in Winkelman was
whether a lay parent may vindicate rights conferred by IDEA.
The Court answered this question by clarifying that IDEA pro-
vides a parent with a substantive right for the child to obtain a FAPE. 12
The Court determined that IDEA confers upon a parent a substantive
right that is separate from the child's right to a FAPE.13 Because
IDEA confers rights upon parents, "they are, as a result, entitled to
prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf."4 Accordingly, lay par-
ents may prosecute an IDEA claim pro se because they are vindicating
their own independent rights (the parent's substantive right to the
child receiving a FAPE), rather than stepping into the shoes of their
children to vindicate the children's rights.'5
Winkelman is the ninth major ruling from the Court under IDEA
since the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA)-
IDEA's predecessor-became law in 1975. 6 The decision has been
9 The Council of Parent Attorneys and Parent Advocates, Inc. estimates that
"approximately 36% of children with disabilities live in families that earn less than
$25,000 a year; over 2 / 3 earn less than $50,000 a year." Press Release, Council of
Parent Attorneys and Parent Advocates, Supreme Court Supports Parents' Right to
Represent Themselves in IDEA Cases in Court (May 21, 2007), http://www.copaa.
org/news/winkleman-news.html. In comparison, litigating an IDEA claim can range
from $10,000 to more than $100,000. Brief for Council of Parent Attorneys and Ad-
vocates, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9-10, Winkelman v.
Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (No. 05-983), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 1319.
:0 See infa notes 64-65 and accompanying text.1 See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
12 Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 533.
13 Id. at 531.
14 Id. at 535.
15 Id.
16 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006); Schaffer v.
Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005); Cedar Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999);
Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S.
305 (1988); Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359
(1985); Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); Bd. of Educ. of Hen-
drick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Since Winkelman, the
Court has heard another case under IDEA, City Board of Education of the City
School District of New York v. Tom F., 128 S. Ct. 1 (2007) (per curiam). The Court
in Tom F. considered whether a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, requiring a school district to reimburse parents for placement in
a private school when the child had not previously received special education services
982 [Vol. 39:981
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widely publicized as a major victory for parents.1 7  Advocates have
characterized the Court's resolution as one of the top three decisions
under IDEA. 8 The "parent friendly" opinion is garnering positive
recognition because the Court's two previous rulings under IDEA fa-
vored school districts.'9 As articulated by one legal scholar, the deci-
sion "provides a badly needed stop to a trend of recently decided an-
ti-disabled child decisions. ' Another advocate has gone further and
opined that the decision in Winkelman shifts the special education
pendulum back toward parents.
2 1
The news frenzy surrounding the decision in Winkelman has
created a sense of optimism among parents and advocates that the
decision will enable more families to prevail in special education dis-
from a public agency, contradicted "the plain language of 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a) (10) (C) (ii) which authorizes tuition reimbursement to the parents of a dis-
abled child 'who previously received special education and related services under the
authority of a public agency.'" Question Presented, Tom F, 128 S. Ct. 1 (No. 05-
0566), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/06-00637qp.pdf. The Court
divided equally in a four to four decision, with Justice Kennedy not participating;
therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. Less than a week later, the Court declined to grant certiorari in
a case that presented the same question as Tom F., Hyde Park Board of Education v.
Frank G., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 436 (Oct. 15, 2007) (No.
06-580). As in Tom F,Justice Kennedy did not participate. Id.
17 See generally Staff Editorial, Bright Spot: Supreme Court Ruling Backing Parents of
Learning Impaired Children Is a Rare Victory for the Little Guy, Hous. CHRON., July 9,
2007, at B6; Linda Greenhouse, Legal Victory for Families of Disabled Students, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 2007, at A14; Jennifer Radcliffe, Ruling Levels Field in School Suits,
Hous. CHRON., July 5, 2007, at Al; Karen Roebuck, High Court Ruling Victory for Par-
ents of Special-Needs Children, PiTr. TRIB. REv. (May 26, 2007), available at http://www.
pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/rss/s-509645.html ; infra Part III.E.
8 Mark Walsh, Experts Ponder Whether Parents Will Rush to Court, EDUC. WK.,Jtmne 6,
2007, at 18-19.
19 In these decisions the Court determined that IDEA does not authorize prevail-
ing parents to recover expert fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B) and that the bur-
den of proof in IDEA disputes lies on the party seeking relief. Arlington, 548 U.S.
291; Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49.
20 Posting of Mitchell H. Rubinstein to Adjunct Law Prof Blog, http://law
professors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/2007/05/supreme-court-d.html (May 22,
2007).
21 The Kojo Nnamdi Show, Supreme Court & Special Education (WAMU 88.5FM radio
broadcast May 24, 2007), available at http://www.wamu.org/programs/kn/07/
05/24.php#1619 (on file with author). Peter Wright, a special education attorney,
explained that the special education pendulum swung heavily toward school districts
after the decisions in Arlington and Schaffer "[W]e saw the pendulum having swung
pretty far out and many parents being intimidated around the country." Id. Wright
opines that the special education pendulum is swinging back in favor of parents fol-
lowing the decision in Winkelman. Id. Wright's comment was made prior to the
Court's ruling in Tom F. and the Court's denial of certification in Frank G. See supra
note 16.
2009]
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putes. However, this may not necessarily be the case. The Court de-
termined that IDEA gives parents independent and enforceable
rights and, in turn, parents may appear in court to vindicate their pa-
rental rights under IDEA.2  The Court's holding greatly expanded
parental rights under IDEA by lifting a bar on lay parents prosecuting
claims pro se, but it did not alter the standard that parents must es-
tablish in order to be a prevailing party under IDEA. Additionally,
the Court declined to entertain the petitioner's alternative argument
that parents may litigate the claims of their children 23 Most impor-
tantly, the Court failed to discuss the implications of its ruling on key
sections of IDEA's statutory scheme. As a result of this last failure,
parents and school districts will have to test IDEA's key provisions to
discern whether the new rights given to parents under Winkelman will
alter judicial interpretation of IDEA. Whether Winkelman actually
helps parents successfully prosecute violations of IDEA will likely de-
pend on lower court interpretations of IDEA post-Winkelman.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of IDEA that in-
cludes the history of the statute, the statute's framework, and high-
lights of the "anti-parent" decisions that have made it more difficult
for parents to prosecute IDEA claims successfully. Part III describes
the procedural history of Winkelman, the Court's decision in Winkel-
man, and reactions to the Court's holding. Part IV identifies the
three questions that lower courts may face following the Court's hold-
ing: (1) whether a parent may prosecute a child's rights in court, (2)
whether parents are entitled to attorney fees if they prevail, and (3)
to what standard should parents be held when a prevailing school dis-
trict seeks attorney fees. Part V provides recommendations for how
courts should resolve those ambiguities: (1) a parent may not prose-
cute a child's rights, but courts should allow a parent to continue liti-
gating the substance of the claim, (2) attorney-parents may be able to
recover attorney fees for prosecuting the rights of a child, but attor-
ney-parents and lay parents will be precluded from recovering attor-
ney-fees for prosecuting parental rights pro se, and (3) parents
should have attorney fees shifted to them for violations of either §
1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II) or § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (III).
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007).
23 Id.
984 [Vol. 39:981
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 984 2009
COMMENT
II. IDEA BEFORE WINKELMAN V. PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
A. History of lDEA
The EHA, the predecessor to IDEA, 4 was a "groundbreaking
piece of legislation that reshaped the American educational land-
scape and remains the foundation of special education programs in
all fifty states.,' 25 Prior to the EHA's passage, Congress articulated
that "It]here are over 8 million handicapped children in the United
States; yet only 3.9 million are currently receiving an appropriate
education; 1.75 million handicapped youngsters are receiving no aid
at all; and 2.5 million children are receiving inadequate education.
2 6
Congress enacted IDEA to ensure that children with disabilities are
not ignored in the classroom.27 As a funding statute, IDEA provides
federal grants to states to assist in educating students with disabili-
211ties. In exchange for accepting federal funds, a state educational
agency must assume responsibility for ensuring that children with
disabilities within its jurisdiction receive a free and appropriate edu-
cation (FAPE) .29
B. IDEA's Framework
Today more than 6.8 million students in the United States re-
ceive services pursuant to IDEA.3 ° The touchstone of IDEA is ensur-
ing "children with disabilities and the families of such children access
to a [FAPE]."" To guarantee that children with disabilities are pro-
24 The EHA was renamed IDEA in December 1990. THOMAS F. GUERNSEY &
KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 1 (2d ed. 2001).
25 Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners at 3, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (No. 05-983).
26 Id. at 5 (quoting 121 CONG. REc. 37024 (1975) (statement of Rep. Brademas)).
For a more detailed history of IDEA and eligibility under IDEA, see Wendy F. Hensel,
Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the IDEA, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1147,
1147-51 (2007).
27 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2) (2006).
28 GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 24, at 6.
2 Id. at 6.
30 Data Accountability Center, supra note 4.
S 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (3). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) statutorily defines a FAPE as,
special education and related services that-
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision
and direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate pre-school, elementary school, or sec-
ondary school education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
program required under section 1414(d) of this title.
20091 985
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vided with the substantive right to a FAPE, IDEA contains aggressive
procedural safeguards.32
Students with disabilities are provided their substantive right to a
FAPE through the development and implementation of an individua-
lized education plan (IEP) .a  The IEP process is comprised of an
evaluation, a conclusion of eligibility for specialized services, a crea-
tion of an IEP, and ultimately a determination of an educational
placement. 34 The IEP document must include the student's current
educational levels and set forth a plan for achieving measurable an-
nual goals.35 Additionally, the IEP must detail the special education
services, related services, supplementary services, and supplementary
aids that will be provided to the student.36 Parents are intimately in-
volved throughout the process of developing a student's IEP .
Section 1415 of IDEA sets forth multiple procedural safeguards
to ensure that students with disabilities receive a FAPE. These proce-
dural safeguards require a school district to notify a parent of any
proposed change to an IEP.38 Section 1415 also provides avenues for
a parent to challenge an IEP when they believe it does not provide
the child with a FAPE.39 Parents are first entitled to an impartial due
Id. § 1401(9).
32 Congress was explicit in articulating the procedural protections, but articu-
lated the substantive protections vaguely. Nevertheless, the Court has recognized the
importance of both the procedural and substantive protections equally:
[I]t seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit
as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents
and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the
administrative process .. . as it did upon the measurement of the re-
sulting IEP against a substantive standard.
Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-06
(1982).
33 See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1414.
34 Id.
35 Id. § 1414(d) (1) (A) (i) (I)-(III).
Id. § 1414(d) (1) (A) (i) (IV). Related services include transportation, speech
language pathology, occupational therapy, audiology, and other services or aids ne-
cessary to enable a child to utilize the education being provided to them. Id. §
1401(26) (A).
37 Parents must be informed of and consent to evaluations, they must be in-
cluded as members of the IEP team and must be given access to the child's records,
and they must give final consent before an IEP may be implemented. Id. §§1414 (a) (1) (D), (c) (3), (d) (1) (B) (i), 1415(b) (1).
38 Id. § 1415(b)(3).
39 For an interesting discussion on the "creeping judicialization" of special educa-
tion hearings, see Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha & Anastasia D'Angelo, Creeping
Judicialization in Special Education Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L.JUD. 27 (2007).
986
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40process hearing, where a hearing officer will determine whether
there has been a substantive or procedural violation which has re-
sulted in the denial of a FAPE to the student.4' A parent aggrieved by
the decision may appeal to the state educational agency,42 which will
conduct an impartial review and make an independent decision as to
whether there was a denial of a FAPE.4 3 After exhausting these ad-
44
ministrative remedies, parents may bring a civil action in state or
federal court.
4 5
To help encourage parents to actively enforce the provisions of
46IDEA, Congress created a fee-shifting provision in IDEA. Courts
have explained that "fee-shifting statutes are meant to encourage the
effective prosecution of meritorious claims, and [these statutes] seek
to achieve this purpose by encouraging parties to obtain independent
40 Parents may submit a written complaint to their state educational agency alleg-
ing that their child is being denied a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (1) (A). In turn, the
state educational agency will convene an impartial due process hearing. Id. Howev-
er, prior to the hearing, the parents and Local Educational Agency, the school dis-
trict, must submit to a resolution session. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B). A representative of
the state educational agency with decision making authority will conduct the session.
Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(II). The parties will discuss the complaint and the facts form-
ing the basis of the complaint. Id. § 1415(f) (1) (B) (i) (IV). The Local Educational
Agency is provided an opportunity to resolve the complaint at the resolution session.
Id. However, the parent(s) and Local Educational Agency may waive the resolution
session or submit to mediation, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). If the Local Educa-
tional Agency has not resolved the dispute to the satisfaction of the parents within
thirty days of the filing of the complaint, then the due process hearing timelines will
commence. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii). At the hearing, a hearing officer, an employee
of the state educational agency, will hear and review evidence presented by the par-
ties as to whether the child received a FAPE. Id. § 1415(f) (3) (A) (i) (I).
41 Id. § 1415(f) (3) (E).
(i) In general. Subject to clause (ii), a decision made by a hearing of-
ficer shall be made on substantive grounds based on a determination
of whether the child received a [FAPE]. (ii) Procedural issues. In mat-
ters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing officer may find that a
child did not receive a [FAPE] only if the procedural inadequacies -
(I) impeded the child's right to a free public education; (II) signifi-
candy impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the deci-
sionmaking process regarding the provision of a [FAPE] to a parent's
child; or (III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.
Id.
42 Id. § 14 15(g)(1). States are allowed to develop and maintain a mediation
process to resolve disputes as to whether a child is receiving a FAPE. Id. §
1415(g) (1). Some states require parent(s) and a school district to engage in media-
tion prior to the impartial due process hearing. Id.
43 Id. § 1415(g) (2).
44 Id. § 1415(i) (2) (B).
45 Id. § 1415(i) (2) (A).
46 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B).
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representation. , '' Thus, when a court determines that a parent is the
prevailing party in an IDEA dispute, the parent may recover reasona-
ble attorney fees and costs for prosecuting the claim. 4
However, Congress did not want to encourage parents to bring
frivolous IDEA suits. 4 ) The 2004 amendments to IDEA reflect this no-
tion in two new provisions. First, an attorney may be required to pay
the attorney fees of a prevailing school district or state educational
agency when the attorney files an action that is "frivolous, unreasona-
ble, or without foundation," or when the attorney litigates "after the
litigation clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda-
tion. ' 5° Second, a parent or the attorney for the parent may be re-
quired to pay attorney fees if a claim was filed "for any improper pur-
pose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.
'
01
C. Recent IDEA Decisions Have Made It More Difficult for
Parents to Prevail
Two Supreme Court decisions prior to Winkelman-Schaffer v.
Weast 52 and Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Mur-
phy53-have been characterized as "anti-disabled child" decisions. 4 In
Schaffer, the Court held that the burden of proof in IDEA cases lies
with the party that wishes to change an IEP.5 A parent is usually the
party seeking to change an IEP5G and, in turn, will bear the burden of
showing that an IEP does not provide the child with a FAPE. 57 Six
47 Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore County, 165 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1998).
48 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(I).
49 See infra Part V.C.
50 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
5 I d. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (III).
52 546 U.S. 49 (2006).
53 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
54 Posting of Mitchell H. Rubinstein to Adjunct Law Prof Blog, supra note 20.
55 Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 51, 62.
56 See Andrew Trotter, High Court Boosts Districts in IDEA Cases, EDUC. WK., Nov. 30,
2005, at 27, 29.
57 The Court in Schaffer chose not to address whether a state may independently
pass legislation that always places the burden of proof on the school district. Schaffer,
546 U.S. at 62. However, at least eleven states and the District of Columbia maintain
statutes that have placed the burden of proof on school districts, none of which have
been struck down since the decision in Schaffer. DEP'T OF THE PUB. ADVOcATE, Div. OF
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY, ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS HEARINGS 5-6 (2007), available at http://www.state.
nj.us/publicadvocate/public/BurdenofProofReport.pdf; Press Release, Governor
Spitzer Signs Legislation Shifting Burden of Proof to School Districts In Disputes
988 [Vol. 39:981
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months after Schaffer, the Court in Arlington determined that prevail-
ing parents may not recover expert fees for services involved in litigat-
ing an IDEA claim. 5 The Court asked whether a state official would
understand that accepting IDEA funds would obligate the state to
compensate prevailing parents for expert fees incurred in asserting
an IDEA claim.59 The Court determined that states would not clearly
have understood the text of IDEA to obligate them to pay the expert
fees of prevailing parents. 60 Parent organizations were offended by
the Court's analysis and reasoning.6' The practical effect of the deci-
sion is that Arlington placed a financial hurdle in front of a parent
bringing an IDEA suit who, subject to the decision in Schaffer, has to
show the child was denied a FAPE.62
III. THE WNKELM4ANDECISION
A. The Circuit Split Leading Up to Winkelman
Before Winkelman, a three-way circuit split existed between six
circuits as to whether parents were an aggrieved party under §
1415(i) (2) (A).63 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that parents were permitted to prosecute their own pro-
cedural claims pro se, as well as their children's substantive IDEA
Over Special Education Programs (Aug. 16, 2007), available at http://www.ny.gov/
governor/press/0816073.html.
58 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 548 U.S. at 294.
59 Id. at 296.
60 Id. at 303.
6I Maura A. Collinsgru, Director for the Parent Information Center, saw the deci-
sion as "decimating to parents," and remarked that "[t]he majority speaks about our
disabled children as though they are commodities under the spending clause .... It
was very insulting to parents and those who work with them." Mark Walsh, Justices
Rule Against Parents in IDEA Case, EDUC. WK.,July 12, 2006, at 32.
62 Drew S. Days III, who filed an amicus brief for the National Disability Rights
Network and the Center for Law and Education, commented on the effect of this de-
cision on families with children with disabilities: "The fact they will not be able to
hire an educational consultant with the expectation that, even if they are successful,
they could be reimbursed will substantially limit the degree to which parents can
represent their interests effectively." Id.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2) (A) (2006) states that
[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsec-
tion (f) or (k) who does not have the right to an appeal under subsec-
tion (g), and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made
under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil action with
respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which ac-
tion may be brought in any State court of competentjurisdiction or in
a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in
controversy.
2009] 989
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claims. 4 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits held that parents were permitted to
appear pro se to assert their own procedural rights, but were not
permitted to appear pro se to assert the substantive rights of their
children. 65 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School District, 66 went further than any
67
of its sister circuits in restricting a parent's ability to appear pro se.
The court of appeals held that "the right to receive a FAPE belongs to
the child alone," and that any right a parent may have to appear pro
se is a derivative of the child's right to a FAPE. 5 This meant that par-
ents in the Sixth Circuit could never prosecute an IDEA claim pro se
in federal court, regardless of whether the claims were procedural or
substantive in nature.69
B. The Winkelman Family and Procedural History
Jacob Winkelman was a ten-year-old boy with an autism spectrum
disorder.70 He first entered the Parma City School District as a pre-
schooler and suffered severe emotional outbursts in his first educa-
64 Maroni v. Plymouth Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247, 250 (lst Cir. 2003) ("Congress has
granted parents a right of action under IDEA regardless of whether their IDEA suits
present procedural or substantive claims.").
65 Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527, 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2006) (re-
cognizing that parents are entitled to sue pro se when their procedural rights under
IDEA are infringed, but they may not represent their children's claims pro se); Wen-
ger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that a
parent may appear pro se to assert "his claims that his own rights as a parent under
the IDEA were violated by defendants," but claims brought on behalf of the child
should be dismissed without prejudice if parent is unable to find attorney representa-
tion and if the court concludes a guardian ad litem should not be appointed sua
sponte); Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1998)
(noting that IDEA grants specific procedural rights to parents but that "Congress did
not clearly intend to create joint rights in parents under the IDEA"); Devine v. In-
dian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 582 (lth Cir. 1997) ("[P]arents who are
not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child's behalf ... because it
helps to ensure that children rightfully entitled to legal relief are not deprived of
their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents.").
Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005).
67 The Cavanaugh court realized that "it was furthering a circuit split and [dismissed
the] entire appeal." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (No. 05-983), available at http://www.scotusblog.
com/movabletype/archives/WinkelmanPetition.pdf (emphasis added).
68 Cavanaugh, 409 F.3d at 757.
69 See id.
70 See Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 519.
990 [Vol. 39:981
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tional placement. 71 Jacob's mother, Sandee Winkelman, described
his experience in the first placement, "His behaviors were extremely
severe and aggressive .... Teachers and aides would have to hold
him down. He was miserable. 72  In response, the school district
placed Jacob in a private school and funded the cost of the tuition .
For Jacob's kindergarten year, the school district proposed placing
him in a special education classroom within the district.74 The Win-
kelmans opposed this placement and challenged Jacob's IEP through
the state's administrative appeal process; however, their efforts
proved futile, as they lost each appeal . v
Before the court of appeals' ruling in Cavanaugh, Jacob's pa-
rents76 filed a claim 77 in the United States District Court for the Dis-
71 Tony Mauro, Parents Fight for the Right to Represent Their Children in Case Before





75 Id. The Winkelmans challenged the IEP because it "did not contain a specific
plan to implement occupational therapy, did not contain a sufficient amount of
speech therapy or one-on-one instruction, and did not include music therapy." Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at 5.
76 The Winkelmans are a family with five children, who live on a household in-
come of less than $40,000 per year. Id. at 5 n.2. Jacob's sisterJenna also suffers from
autism. Id. The Winkelmans "have no savings, face a monthly mortgage payment of
$1300, and incur significant medical expenses for Jacob andJenna." Id. Due to the
amount of time needed to take care of Jacob and Jenna, Mrs. Winkelman has been
unable to work. Id. Jacob's current school, the Monarch School, costs $56,000 a
year. Id. at 5. The Winkelmans finance Jacob's education through a combination of
loans and second mortgages. Mauro, supra note 71. Mrs. Winkelman has remarked
that it may take up to thirty years to pay off the school expenses. Id.
77 It is important to note that parents representing their children pro se have
been accused of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The Cleveland Bar
Association (CBA) alleged that Mr. Woods, a parent who represented his son's claims
pro se, was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Adam Liptak, NonlawyerFa-
ther Wins His Suit over Education, and the Bar Is Upset, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE, May 6, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/06/us/06parents.html?_r-l &oref=slogin. The
CBA "sought a $10,000 fine, lawyers' fees and a promise that he would not continue
to assist other parents seeking to represent their own children in court." Id. Follow-
ing an order from the Supreme Court of Ohio to produce evidence supporting the
allegations in the CBA's complaint, the CBA withdrew its complaint, noting that it
should have waited until the court decided Winkelman and that its board did not ap-
prove the filing of the claim. Id. There have also been reports that the CBA consi-
dered fining the Winkelmans $10,000 for the unauthorized practice of law in their
pro se representation of Jacob. See Patrick O'Donnell, Bar Association Battles Parents,
CLEV. PLAIN DEALER (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://wv.bridges4kids.org/articles
/4-06/PlainDealer4-27-06.html. Following the decision in Winkelman, it is unclear
whether the CBA will continue bringing suit against parents representing IDEA
2009]
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trict of Ohio."' The appeal challenged the decision of an Indepen-
dent Hearing Officer and State Level Review Officer that Jacob re-
ceived a FAPE and simultaneously alleged that the Independent
Hearing Officer violated the Winkelmans' procedural rights under
IDEA.79 The district court granted judgment for the local school ad-
ministration ("Parma City").80 The Winkelmans appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit," but the court
handed down its decision in Cavanaugh before the Winkelmans filed
their appeal.8 2 Parma City filed a motion to dismiss the pro se ap-
peal. 3 The court of appeals granted the motion and dismissed the
Winkelmans' entire appeal, holding that the Winkelmans "are not
permitted to represent Jacob in this court nor can they pursue their
own IDEA claims pro se." 84 On October 27, 2006, the Supreme Court
85granted the Winkelmans' writ of certiorari.
claims pro se, especially since the Court in Winkelman declined to answer whether
parents may represent their children's IDEA claims pro se. See infra Part TV.
78 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at 9.
79 Petitioners alleged that three substantive violations in Jacob's 2003-04 IEP de-
nied him a FAPE. They asserted that the IEP: (1) "did not contain specific goals and
objectives for occupational therapy," (2) did not provide one-on-one academic in-
struction for speech therapy and reduced the duration of Jacob's speech therapy in-
struction, and (3) failed to include music therapy. They also alleged three proce-
dural violations: (1) in developing the 2003-04 IEP, the school district
predetermined an education placement for Jacob without receiving meaningful in-
put from Jacob's parents, (2) the IHO "impermissibly allowed her research assistant
to 'co-preside' over the proceedings," and (3) the administrative hearings failed to
render a decision within the forty-five days allowed by IDEA. Id. at 6-8.
80 Id. at 8. The district court ruled for the respondents, on the pleadings, on
June 2, 2005. Id.
81 Id.
82 Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005). The de-
cision in Cavanaugh was handed down on May 18, 2005. Id.
83 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at 8.
84 Id. at 9. The court of appeals stayed its order for thirty days to allow the Win-
kelmans the opportunity to secure counsel. Id. Two weeks later, the Winkelmans
moved to the United States Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit for an extension to
the thirty-day stay to allow the Winkelmans the chance to submit a petition for certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. Id. On December 1, 2005, the court of appeals denied
the Winkelmans' motion. Id. However, that same day, the Winkelmans submitted an
application to stay the order of the court to Justice Stevens, the CircuitJustice for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Id. A day later, Justice Stevens
granted the Winkelmans' application and stayed the decision of the court of appeals
until after the Supreme Court determined whether to grant certiorari. Id.
Order Granting Certiorari, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516
(2007) (No. 05-983), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00983qp.
pdf.
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C. The Majority Decision in Winkelman
In Winkelman, the Court set out to clarify "whether parents, ei-
ther on their own behalf or as representatives of the child, may pro-
ceed in court unrepresented by counsel though they are not trained
or licensed as attorneys. 8 6 The Court determined that "parents enjoy
rights under IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute
IDEA claims on their own behalf.
87
It is beyond dispute that the relationship between a parent and
child is sufficient to support a legally cognizable interest in the
education of one's child; and, what is more, Congress has found
that "the education of children with disabilities can be made
more effective by ... strengthening the role and responsibility of
parents and ensuring that families of such children have mea-
ningful opportunities to participate in the education of their
children at school and at home."
In discerning that parents have rights under IDEA, the Court chose
not to resolve the petitioner's alternative argument that IDEA enables
parents to litigate the child's claims pro se. s9 This narrow holding
may trigger problems for parents, special education practitioners,
school districts, and judges in interpreting key provisions of IDEA.""
The Court reached its holding by acknowledging that IDEA's
"interlocking statutory provisions" answer the question of whether
parents have independent, enforceable rights. 9' The Court looked to
IDEA's statutory text and engaged in a thorough analysis9 of IDEA's
entire statutory scheme. 93 Following this overview, the Court dis-
cerned that it would be inconsistent with IDEA's statutory scheme to
prohibit parents from proceeding pro se in federal court because
parents have rights at the administrative stage.94 The Court ex-
plained that the express terms of IDEA contemplate that
parents will be the parties bringing the administrative complaints
.... Nothing in these interlocking provisions excludes a parent
who has exercised his or her own rights from statutory protection
the moment the administrative hearings end .... Through its
86 Winkelman, 550 U.S..at 520.
87 Id. at 535.
Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (5)).
89 Id.
90 See infra Parts IV, V.
91 Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 522.
92 Following precedent, the Court considered IDEA's statutory scheme in its enti-
rety. Id. at 523 (citing Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)).
Id. at 523-26.
94 Id. at 526.
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provisions for expansive review and extensive arental involve-
ment, the statute leads to just the opposite result.
Because parents are accorded rights under IDEA, they may prosecute
IDEA claims pro se.
9 6
The remainder of the opinion focused on refuting the respon-
dent's arguments. First, the respondents asserted that a parent is on-
ly involved in the IEP process to represent the interests of the child. 97
The Justices in the majority disagreed, determining that IDEA's pro-
visions bar that interpretation because one purpose of IDEA is "to en-
sure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such
children are protected., 98 The Court explained that "[tlhe word
'rights' in the quoted language refers to the rights of parents as well
as the rights of the child; otherwise the grammatical structure would
make no sense."9 IDEA "presumes parents have rights of their own"
because IDEA provides a section that defines how "States might pro-
vide for the transfer of the 'rights accorded to parents' by IDEA."'
0 °
Adopting the respondent's reading of IDEA "would require an inter-
pretation of these statutory provision (and others) far too strained to
be correct."' 1
The majority also disagreed with respondent's assertion that ref-
erences to parents within IDEA are "best understood as accommoda-
tions to the fact of the child's incapacity."'91 2 The sole purpose of pa-
rental involvement is not merely "to facilitate vindication of a child's
rights."'103  Rather, a parent has an established legal interest in the
child's upbringing and specifically in the education of the child:
"[w] ithout question a parent of a child with a disability has a particu-
lar and personal interest in fulfilling 'our national policy of ensuring
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities."'
0 4
Bolstering its analysis, the majority carefully pointed out the in-
congruent outcomes that would result from allowing parents to assert
only procedural violations. The Court observed that IDEA's "proce-
95 Id. at 527.
96 Id. at 535.
97 Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 527.
98 Id. at 528 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1) (B) (2006)) (emphasis added).
99 Id.
,oo Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(B)).
101 Id.
102 Id. (quoting Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore County, 165 F.3d 260, 263 (4th
Cir. 1998)).
103 Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 528-29.
"04 Id. at 529 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1)).
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dural and reimbursement-related rights are intertwined with the
substantive adequacy of the education provided to a child.., and it is
difficult to disentangle the provisions in order to conclude that some
rights adhere to both parent and child while others do not."'' Addi-
tionally, if a distinction is drawn between the procedural and substan-
tive rights accorded in IDEA a "confusing and onerous legal regime"
would be imposed upon parties.0 6 This would be compounded by
the fact that IDEA does not delineate for a court how to distinguish
between substantive and procedural rights. 0 7 Moreover, such a read-
ing would leave some parents without a remedy because a parent as-
serting a substantive violation of the child's FAPE would have re-
course in only two situations: (1) when the claim is "related to the
procedures employed," and (2) "when he or she is able to incur, and
has in fact incurred, expenses creating a right to reimbursement.',
0 8
Ultimately, the Court concluded that IDEA gives parents their own
independent and enforceable rights, "which are not limited to cer-
tain procedural and reimbursement-related matters."' 9 Rather, the
rights "encompass the entitlement to a free appropriate public edu-
cation for the parents' child.""0
D. The Dissent in Winkelman
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in part and dissented in
part from the majority opinion."' The dissenting Justices agreed that
105 Id. at 531-32 (internal citations omitted).
106 Id. at 532.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 532-33.
109 Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 533.
110 Id. Although not central to the Court's holding, the Court also addressed the
respondent's argument that recognizing that parents have rights under IDEA would
violate the Spending Clause. Id. at 533-35. Pursuant to the Spending Clause, a law
must provide a clear notice before it can "burden a State with some new condition,
obligation, or liability." Id. at 533. The respondents premised their argument on Ar-
lington and asserted that states were not provided with clear notice because IDEA is
ambiguous as to whether parents have independent rights. Id. at 533-34. The Court
clarified that situation as not analogous to Arlington because determining that par-
ents have "independent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condi-
tion or obligation on States they would not otherwise be required by law to observe."
Id. at 534. Additionally, the amount and types of recovery under IDEA are "not ex-
panded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child." Id.
The Court explained that although the class of individuals who have rights under the
statute is now expanded, it does not increase a State's statutory obligations. Id.
Moreover, States may recover attorneys fees, pursuant to § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II),
when a parent presents a complaint "for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to
cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation." Id. at 535.
I Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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parents may proceed in federal court pro se when asserting proce-
dural violations or when seeking reimbursement." 2 However, the dis-
sent explained that parents may not proceed pro se when seeking "a
judicial determination that their child's [FAPE] is substantively in-
adequate."
1 1 3
Like the majority, the dissenting Justices looked to IDEA's statu-
tory text. "14 The dissent expressed that the majority opinion "sweeps
far more broadly than the text [of IDEA] allows. '"1 5 Justices Scalia
and Thomas found that the express language of IDEA only granted
parents two types of rights: (1) procedural protections and (2) the
right to reimbursement for educating the child privately when the lo-
cal school district failed to provide the child with a FAPE."1 The Jus-
tices asserted that IDEA "is replete with references to the fact that a
FAPE belongs to the child."' 7 The dissent went on to explain that
"parents of a disabled child no doubt have an interest in seeing their
child receive a proper education. But there is a difference between
an interest and a statutory right. The text of the IDEA makes clear that
parents have no right to the education itself."".8
In the dissentingJustices' view, whether parents may prosecute a
claim pro se hinges on the interaction of IDEA and the Judiciary Act
of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1654."' The Judiciary Act allows parties to
represent their rights pro se: "In all courts of the United States the
parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by coun-
sel."' 2 ° Under the dissent's analysis, a parent is not a "party ag-
grieved" when asserting a substantive violation of the child's FAPE
112 Id. at 535-36.
"1 Id. at 536.
114 Id.
"' Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 538 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
118 Id. at 537.
17 Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
118 Id.
HO Id. at 536. The ability to assert one's rights is rooted in the Judiciary Act of
1789. It is one of our country's oldest and most formative legal statutes. See United
States Marshals Service, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Charter for U.S. Marshals and
Deputies, http://www.usdoj.gov/marshals/history/udiciary/udiary-act.Iof789.hin
(last visited Feb. 16, 2009). The Act was the first bill passed by our country's First
Congress, and it chartered a federal judiciary system which set forth the jurisdiction
andpowers of circuit and district courts and qualifications for federal judges. Id.
12,28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006). When Congress confers rights on individuals and
provides a private right of action to vindicate those rights, individuals may prosecute
their claims pro se, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Prior to the decision in Winkelman,
lower courts concluded, similar to the dissent, that parents may not utilize 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 to represent their child in federal court. See, e.g., Devine v. Indian River
County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 581 (11th Cir. 1997).
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because parents are not expressly accorded the right to have the
child receive a FAPE. 121 Therefore, parents may not prosecute a subs-
tantive claim pro se because they are not a party aggrieved under the
statute, pursuant to § 1415(i) (2) (A). 22
E. Reactions to the Decision
Following the release of Winkelman, media outlets throughout
the country reported the outcome. Amici for the petitioners, parent
advocacy organizations, self-help organizations, blogs, and even the
generalized media hailed the decision in Winkelman as a major victory
for parents. Autism Aspergers Digest Magazine pointed out that Winkel-
man "allows for a consistent and logical progression between adminis-
trative proceedings, at which parents are permitted to participate
without legal representation, and judicial actions, at which, prior to
Winkelman, many federal courts prohibited parents from proceeding
unless they either were represented by counsel or were attorneys
themselves."'123  The Council for Parent Attorneys and Advocates
echoed similar comments: "This is a significant victory for parents in
many circuits who found the courthouse door barred unless they had
a lawyer or presented only a claim on a narrow set of procedural
rights."'124 The Autism Society of America "applauded the Supreme
Court's decision,"'1 5 and a Houston Chronicle editorial remarked, "In a
welcome exception, the nation's highest court put its opinion behind
121 Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 538 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
122 Id. at 536-37.
123 Barbara E. Etkind & Prashant K. Khetan, Post-Winkelman: Ensuring Good Educa-
tion for Special Needs Children, AUTISM ASPERGER'S DIG. MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2007, at 48, 56.
124 Council of Parent Attorneys and Parent Advocates, supra note 9. The Council,
also an amici in the case, cautioned, however, that "the victory remains bittersweet as
many parents still cannot afford attorneys and cannot afford due process because
they are unable to pay for the expert witnesses needed to bear their burden of
proof." Id. For these parents
IDEA is the only tool available to ensure their children receive FAPE.
The IDEA was not intended to deny children FAPE or other IDEA
rights because of the shortage of qualified lawyers willing and able to
accept unprofitable IDEA cases. Congress included parents in every
critical point of the statutory scheme. To do otherwise would unnatu-
rally dismantle rights which are inherently married and interdepen-
dent.
Id.
125 Marguerite Kirst Colston, Supreme Court Decides for Parents in Winkelman v.
Parma, AUTISM SOC'Y OF AM., May 21, 2007, http://www.autism-
society.org/site/News2?
page=NewsArticle&id=9591. The Autism Society of America is the country's largest
parent-led autism advocacy organization and submitted an amicus brief in support of
petitioners in Winkelman. Id.
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the rights of parents of special needs children to take school districts
to court without having to hire high-priced lawyers."'1
26
In contrast, amici for respondents and education news outlets
focused their commentary on the day-to-day implications of the deci-
sion for schools, attorneys, and courts. Education Week pondered
whether parents will now rush to court. 12 7 Similarly, the National
School Boards Association (NSBA) commented that "[w]hile we un-
derstand the court's desire not to foreclose a parent's day in court, we
are concerned that the decision may encourage parents to litigate ra-
ther than collaborate." 28  The NSBA advised that attorneys
representing schools will have to "take extra steps and extra time to
ensure that parents understand the intricacies of litigation, which
could increase districts' costs.' ' 12 9 Additionally, the organization went
on to caution that "[s] pecial education cases often amount to a battle
of the experts," and "[i] t is not certain that a non-lawyer parent will
have the legal know-how to properly elicit or challenge testimony that
will ultimately help the court decide what is in the best interest of a
child." 1
0
IV. WINKELMAN MAY NOT BE A VICTORY BECAUSE OF THE
AMBIGUITIES CREATED BY ITS NARROW HOLDING
The practical effect of the Winkelman decision is that, while it
solved an important discrete ambiguity in IDEA, '31 it simultaneously
created new ambiguities in IDEA's statutory text. The majority in
Winkelman crafted a narrow holding and failed to discuss how the de-
cision affects key provisions of IDEA. As a result, at least three key
provisions are ambiguous. These ambiguities may be resolved by
lower court interpretations of IDEA post-Winkelman. Lower courts
will need to clarify: (1) whether a parent may prosecute a child's
rights in court, (2) whether parents are entitled to attorney fees if
they prevail, and (3) to what standard parents will be held when a
126 Staff Editorial, supra note 17.
127 Walsh, supra note 18, at 18-19.
128 Joetta Sack-Minn, Supreme Court Says Parents Can Act as Attorneys in IDEA Suits,
NAT'L SCH. BOARDS AWS'N, June 2007, http://www.nsba.org/HPC/Features/
AboutSBN/SbnArchive/2007/June2007/SupremeCourtsaysparentscanactasattorneys
inIDEAsuits.aspx. The National School Boards Association submitted an amicus
brief in Winkelman in support of respondents. Id.
129 Id.
10 Walsh, supra note 18, at 18-19.
1"Whether, and if so, under what circumstances, non-lawyer parents of a dis-
abled child may prosecute an [IDEA] .. .case pro se in federal court." Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at i.
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prevailing school district seeks attorney fees. The Court's holding in
Winkelman has already caught families prosecuting claims pro se off-
guard and has triggered more issues of statutory interpretation for
the judicial branch.
A. Ambiguity #1: May a Parent Prosecute a Child's Rights in Court?
The Winkelman Court determined that although the rights of the
child and parent are separate, the parent and child retain the same
rights and remedies individually. 132 The Court explained "that IDEA
does not differentiate, through isolated references to various proce-
dures and remedies, between the rights accorded to children and the
rights accorded to parents."''3 3 Moreover, the Court recognized that
the "procedural and reimbursement-related rights are intertwined
with the substantive adequacy of the education provided to a child
and it is difficult to disentangle the provisions in order to conclude that
some rights adhere to both parent and child while others do not.
"134
The Court acknowledged that difficulties would arise from draw-
ing a distinction between the rights and remedies held by children
and those held by parents:
[I] t would impose upon parties a confusing and onerous legal re-
gime, one worsened by the absence of any express guidance in
IDEA concerning how a court might in practice differentiate be-
tween these matters .... The adequacy of the educational pro-
gram is, after all, the central issue in the litigation. The provisions
of IDEA do not set forth these distinctions, and we decline to in-
fer them. "5
After acknowledging that parents and children retain identical rights
and remedies under IDEA, the Court stopped short and declined to
131
address whether a parent may represent a child's claim pro se.1,
Therefore, it is unclear after Winkelman's narrow holding whether a
parent may prosecute a child's IDEA claim when the parent prose-
137
cutes an IDEA claim pro se.
132 Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 531 (2007).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 531-32 (emphasis added).
135 Id. at 532.
13 Id. at 533.
137 See infra Part V.A. for a discussion of the effect of the Court's failure to address
whether a parent may prosecute a child's IDEA claim pro se.
2009] 999
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 999 2009
SETON HALL LA WREVIEW
B. Ambiguity #2: Are Parents Entitled to Recover Attorney Fees if
They Prevail?
Prior to Winkelman, courts allowed parents who are attorneys to
prosecute IDEA violations in court.' 3 IDEA contains an attorney fee-
shifting statute, 39 but the statute is silent as to whether attorney-
parents may recover attorney fees if they are the prevailing party. As
of yet, courts have not awarded attorney fees to an attorney-parent
representing a child.140 However, courts are split as to whether an at-
torney-parent may recover attorney fees. 4'
The Court in Winkelman failed to discuss how its holding would
affect attorney-parents. As a result, it is unclear in what capacity an
attorney-parent asserts an IDEA violation-as an attorney
representing the child or as a pro se parent. This is problematic be-
cause courts use different analyses to determine whether attorney
fees are available to attorney-parents. 14 Therefore, after Winkelman,
questions arise regarding the scope of the attorney fee-shifting sta-
tute. First, may an attorney-parent who prevails in prosecuting viola-
tions of a child's rights recover attorney fees? Second, may an attor-
ney-parent who prevails in prosecuting a violation of a parental right
recover attorney fees? If so, can the same reasoning extend to a lay
parent to permit the parent to recover attorney fees? The answer to
those questions will likely turn on how courts characterize the rela-
tionship between attorney-parent and child post-Winkelman.
Courts have characterized the relationship between attorney-
parent and child in three ways: pro se, not pro se, and principal-
agent.'43 Historically, federal statutes denied awarding attorney fees
to pro se litigants who are attorneys.144 In Kay v. Ehrler, the Court de-
termined that an attorney could not recover fees under 42 U.S.C. §
1988 for successfully representing himself.4 5 The language of 42
138 See Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore County, 165 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1998)
(attorney-parents representing their children pro se may not recover attorney fees).
139 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B).
14 Doe, 165 F.3d at 265 (attorney-parents representing their children pro se may
not recover attorney fees); Matthew V. v. Dekalb County Sch. System, 244 F. Supp. 2d
1331 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609, 612 (D. Md. 1993).
141 Compare Rappaport, 812 F. Supp. at 612, and Doe, 165 F.3d at 263, with Matthew
V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38.
4 See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
14 For an overview of the way in which courts have characterized the attorney-
parent and child relationship, see generally KimberlyJ. Winbush, Annotation, Rights
of Parents to Proceed Pro Se Under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 16 A.L.R. FED.
2d 467 (2007).
:4 SeeKayv. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991).
4 Id. at 437-38.
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U.S.C. § 1988 provides that, "the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party .. .a reasonable attorney's fee." 4 6 The Court
reasoned that a party, even a lawyer, is at a disadvantage when
representing herself because the lawyer is deprived of the judgment
of an independent third-party. 47 Therefore, the Court determined
that "the statutory policy of furthering the successful prosecution of
meritorious claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive
to retain counsel in every such case.
" 4 s
IDEA contains a provision almost identical to the statutory provi-
sion at issue in Kay. 149 Before Winkelman, some courts defined an at-
torney's representation of a child as pro se. 5 ° One court reasoned
that the statute refers to both parent and child and "because of the
close, natural relationship between parent and child, a parent's re-
presentation of a disabled child is effectively pro se representation."'
5 1
Based on the close relationship, the court determined that parents
were effectively representing themselves; therefore, the court ex-
tended the reasoning of Kay and precluded the attorney-parent from
collecting attorney fees under IDEA. 15
2
Kay has been extended even when the court characterized the
attorney-child relationship as not pro se. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a denial of attorney fees to an
attorney-parent who successfully represented his son in administrative
hearings and district court. 53 In the court's view, an attorney-parent
does not represent a child's claim pro se because parents and child-
ren are distinct legal entities under IDEA. 54 The court of appeals
opined that "like attorneys appearing pro se, attorney-parents are
generally incapable of exercising sufficient independent judgment on
behalf of their children to ensure that 'reason, rather than emotion,'
will dictate the conduct of litigation. "'5 The court emphasized that
IDEA's attorney fee provisions "should be read to encourage parents
to obtain independent legal services," because statutory fees are not
146 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
147 Kay, 499 U.S. at 437.
14 Id. at 438.
'49 "[T]he court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of
the costs... - to a prevailing party who is a parent of a child with a disability." 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) & (I) (2000).
150 E.g., Rappaport v. Vance, 812 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1993).
15 Id. at 612.
152 Id.
153 Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore County, 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998).
1 Id. at 263.
155 Id. (quoting Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437 (1991)).
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needed to encourage a parent to litigate a child's IDEA claims to en-
sure that they receive an adequate education. 
56
Building off of the reasoning that parents and children are dis-
tinct legal entities, another court has concluded that attorney-parents
and a child are in a principal-agent relationship.' 7 The United States
District Court for the District of Georgia determined that IDEA's sta-
tutory language does not prohibit an award of fees to attorney-
parents.' 8 First, IDEA contains a provision prohibiting attorney fees
in certain instances,' 59 but it does not mention any prohibition on at-
torney-parents who are prevailing parties.' ° Second, parents and
children are distinct legal entities under IDEA; therefore, the "sepa-
rate status supports the conclusion that a parent-attorney performs in
the 'agency relationship."",16' Third, Georgia's Rules of Professional
Conduct would deter an attorney-parent from acting in an unprofes-
sional manner.6 2 Fourth, an economic analysis supports the notion
that attorney-parents should be able to recover fees since the "parent
is subject to opportunity costs inherent in performing legal work for
her child rather than for a paying client." 163 Finally, the court indi-
cated that "[i]n some cases, a parent-attorney may be the best attor-
ney the child could obtain, and the availability of fees would align the
economic realities of practicing law with the IDEA's primary purpos-
es."'164 Despite its principal-agent categorization of the relationship
between an attorney-parent and a child, the court declined to award
attorney fees to the attorney-parent because the court concluded that
the attorney-parent was not a prevailing party as required to trigger
fee-shifting under § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (I).' 65
The Winkelman Court did not address the effect of its holding on
the attorney fee-shifting provision in IDEA. The narrow holding has
perpetuated the ambiguity regarding the capacity in which attorney-
parents may represent their children's claims, and consequently has
'56 Id. at 264.
157 Matthew V. v. Dekalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337-38 (N.D.
Ga. 2003).
' Id. at 1337.
159 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (D) (2006).
160 Matthew V., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
161 Id. at 1337.
162 Id. at 1337-38. The court indicated that Georgia's Rules do not limit who may
make a grievance about an attorney. Therefore, "such a grievance could be made by
opposing counsel, or even the child's other parent or another family member." Id.
at 1338 n.7 (noting GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-202 (2001)).
163 Id. at 1338.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1338-43.
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left open whether attorney-parents may recover fees under IDEA.
The Court's conclusion that parents have distinct rights, combined
with its failure to discuss the relationship of the attorney-parent and
child, will likely encourage attorney-parents to continue applying to
recover fees. Moreover, the Court's holding triggers the question of
whether lay parents who prevail are entitled to attorney fees under
IDEA. 166
C. Ambiguity #3: To What Standard Will Parents Be Held When a
Prevailing School District Seeks Attorney Fees?
In 2004, Congress reauthorized and amended IDEA to allow a
prevailing school district to recover attorney fees.17 IDEA allows a
court to award attorney fees to a prevailing state educational agency
or school district in two instances. First, § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II) pro-
vides for recovery from the attorney of a parent "who files a complaint
or subsequent cause of action that is frivolous, unreasonable, or with-
out foundation, or against the attorney of a parent who continued to
litigate after the litigation clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation.''68 Second, § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (III) provides for
recovery from the attorney of a parent or the parent "if the parent's
complaint or subsequent cause of action was presented for any im-
proper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to
needlessly increase the cost of litigation."' 69 Therefore, it appears
that attorneys and parents are held to different standards when a
state educational agency or school district tries to recover attorney
fees.
Winkelman creates ambiguity in IDEA's frivolous suit provisions
because the majority did not clearly specify to which standards an at-
torney-parent or lay parent will be held. The Court did acknowledge
the attorney fee-shifting provisions when refuting the respondent's
argument that recognizing parents as having rights would violate the
spending clause. 170 The Court explained that school districts will not
have to face increased costs from unconstrained lawsuits because
monetary relief may be awarded to school districts to recover attorney
fees when parents violate § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (III).17' However, it isunclear what standard pro se parents are held to, what standard at-
166 See infra notes 228-31 and accompanying text for analysis of this question.
167 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II)-(III) (2006).
168 Id. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II) (emphasis added).
169 Id. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (III) (emphasis added).
170 Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 534-35 (2007).
171 Id. at 535.
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torney-parents are held to when representing personal parental
claims, and what standard attorney-parents are held to when
representing a child's claim. Based on predicted increases in IDEA
litigation as a result of Winkelman, school districts will likely be faced
with increasing legal costs. In turn, the frivolous suit provision may
become more attractive to prevailing school districts looking to re-
cover the costs of the litigation. Courts may be faced with school dis-
tricts asserting claims for attorney fees from parents who filed frivol-
ous claims.
V. CLARIFYING NEW QUESTIONS CREATED BY WINKELMAN
A. Ambiguity #1: A Parent May Not Prosecute a Child's Rights, But
Courts Should Allow a Parent to Continue Litigating the Substance
of the Claim
Initially, the Court's failure to answer whether a parent may
represent the child's claim may seem of no moment because either
may vindicate the rights personal to him or her and receive the same
remedy. However, cases subsequent to Winkelman reveal that lay par-
ents do not understand that Winkelman only allows parents to prose-
cute parental rights pro se. Parents are proceeding pro se and listing
the name of the child on the complaint. 172 In response, lower courts
have held that rights held by a child under IDEA are separate from
the rights of the parent, and as a result, the parent may not represent
the child's claim pro se. 173 Lower courts have precluded a parent
from prosecuting the rights of a child since many jurisdictions main-
tain a ban against parents vindicating a child's rights. 1
7 4
172 Alexandra R. v. Brookline Sch. Dist., No. 06-cv-215-SM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66091 (D.N.H. Sept. 6, 2007); Bell v. Anderson Cmty. Sch., No. 1:07-cv-00936-JDT-
WTL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57428 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 2007); L.J. v. Broward County
Sch. Bd., No. 06-61282-CIV-MOORE/GARBER, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41925 (S.D.
Fla.June 8, 2007).
Bell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57428, at *27 n.13; L.J, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
41925, at *5.
174 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana has indi-
cated that the ban against a parent representing a child's IDEA claims will stand even
after Winkelman. See Bell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57428, at *27 n.13 (dismissing of
claim brought by parents applies only to parents' IDEA claims, but not dismissing
children's claims with prejudice).
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Jurisdictions that have precluded parents from bringing their
child's IDEA claims have based their underlying reasoning on tort
cases. 175 These jurisdictions have rationalized that
[t]he choice to appear pro se is not a true choice for minors who
under state law . . . cannot determine their own legal actions.
There is thus no individual choice to proceed pro se for courts to
respect, and the sole policy at stake concerns the exclusion of
non-licensed persons to appear as attorneys on behalf of others.176
In the tort context, children have rights distinct from those of their
parents. The child maintains rights and can receive remedies that
the parent cannot. This reasoning should not be extended to the
context of special education law, because under IDEA parents have
rights that are separate but indistinguishable from the rights of a
child. Thus, parents and children enjoy the same rights and reme-
dies under IDEA. This is a key distinction between IDEA and in-
stances where courts have refused to allow a parent to represent the
child's claims.
If the rights and remedies held by parents and children under
IDEA are indistinguishable and the same remedies are available re-
gardless of whose rights are alleged to have been violated, then the
ultimate outcome of the underlying dispute will not depend on the
names listed as plaintiff. Nevertheless, school districts have an incen-
tive to exploit pro se parents unaware that they may only name them-
selves as plaintiffs. School districts may move to have the claim dis-
missed on the ground that the parents brought the case on behalf of
themselves and the child. Consequently, another level of litigious
posturing is endured to determine the preliminary issue of standing.
In turn, a resolution of the underlying issue-whether the school dis-
trict violated IDEA-is delayed.
For example, in Chase v. Mesa County Valley School District Number
51, a mother motioned the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado to reconsider a previous dismissal of an IDEA claim
that she prosecuted pro se.177 In the initial prosecution, the mother
asserted that her son's rights were violated.18 In response, the court
175 See Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 2005);
Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1998); Col-
lingsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
6 Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Osei-
Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 882-83 (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo,
Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990))).
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issued an order that the mother "lacks standing to represent her mi-
nor son because '[u]nder Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c) and 28 U.S.C. §1654
(1994),... a minor child cannot bring suit through a parent acting
as a next friend if the parent is not represented by an attorney. 1
7 9
Following the grant of certiorari for Winkelman, the mother moved
the court to allow her to bring suit on behalf of her son or to stay
proceedings until the Court ruled in Winkelman.8 0 The court handed
down its order following the decision in Winkelman. 8'
The court acknowledged that Winkelman recognized that parents
have substantive rights under IDEA that are independent of those
conferred by IDEA upon children. 82 The court went on to note that
Winkelman declined to determine whether parents may assert the
rights of a child pro se.183 But the court stopped its analysis there and
denied the mother's motion, holding that "[n]othing in Winkelman
suggests that parents may act pro se to assert the rights of their child-
ren, and long standing law is directly to the contrary."'' 84 The court
failed to consider that while the rights of the parent and child are
separate, the rights and remedies available to each are the same.
Thus, a simple substitution of the mother's name for the child's
name would have sufficed. Now, however, should the mother want to
proceed with the litigation, she will have to either file a pro se com-
plaint with only her name or retain a lawyer to represent her son's
rights.
The court's failure to realize that the mother could have simply
been substituted for the child likely delayed resolution of the under-
lying dispute-whether the school district failed to provide a child
with a FAPE.185 The court's initial order that the mother lacked
standing to pursue her son's claims was issued on January 29, 2007,
and the court issued its denial of the motion to reconsider the order
on September 27, 2007.186 Nine months passed before the mother
knew how to proceed in prosecuting the IDEA violations. For a child,
179 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
180 Id. at * 1-2.
181 Id. at *1.
182 Id. at *3.
183 Chase, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72485, at *3.
184 Id. at *3-4 (citing Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986)).
185 The order does not indicate whether the mother was given the option to assert
her parental rights but refused. See id. Additionally, the order does not indicate to
the mother that she could substitute her name for her son's name and essentially
step into the case where it stands, moving forward with prosecuting violations of her
parental rights. See id.ISO Id. at *1.
1006 [Vol. 39:981
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1006 2009
COMMENT
nine months is approximately a school year. In this case, it is likely
that the child remained in his inadequate educational placement
during the pendency of the suit. He would have had to remain in
that educational placement until his mother decided how to proceed
in alleging the IDEA violations or until an agreement was made with
the school district over his IEP. Should the mother have decided to
continue to prosecute the IDEA violations, the child would have like-
ly remained in the current educational setting until the suit was re-
solved. If the mother was able to prevail in showing a violation of
IDEA, the child would be entitled to compensatory education for the
time period in which he was denied a FAPE-approximately one
school year plus the time for the new suit. Courts must take a more
pragmatic approach than that of the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado.
Should a court receive a complaint filed by a pro se parent that
lists the name of the child, the court should proceed in one of two
ways. First, the court may simply substitute the names on the com-
plaint with only the names of the parents without naming the child as
a plaintiff. Second, the court may dismiss the claims of the child
without prejudice and either continue litigating the claims of the
parents or allow the parents to amend the complaint without cost.
School districts have already moved to dismiss claims prosecuted by
pro se parents who have mistakenly listed the name of the child on
the pro se complaint.
8 7
In Alexandra R. v. Brookline School District, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Hampshire took the first approach
of simply substituting the parents' names on the complaint. 8 The
parents of a student, Sasha, who was eligible for special education
services, appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Department of
Education, which had denied the parents' request for an administra-
tive due process hearing.8 " When the parents filed their appeal in
district court, they listed their names as well as Sasha's name on the
complaint.l°° The school district moved to dismiss the claim, arguing
that Sasha's parents could not represent her legal interests because
187 Alexandra R. v. Brookline Sch. Dist., No. 06-cv-215-SM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66091 (D.N.H. Sept. 6, 2007); Bell v. Anderson Cmty. Sch., No. 1:07-cv-00936-JDT-
WTL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57428 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 2007); L.J. v. Broward County
Sch. Bd., No. 06-61282-CIV-MOORE/GARBER, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41925 (S.D.
Fla June 8, 2007).
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66091, at *2-3.1s9 Id. at *l.
190 Id. at *1-3.
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neither parent was an attorney. 9' The court acknowledged that while
the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit have been presented with the issue of "whether pro se
parents can represent their minor children in IDEA proceedings,"
neither has decided the issue.
9 2
The court recognized that "the rights and interests of parents
and their children under the IDEA are coextensive. Consequently,
even if Sasha's parents cannot, strictly speaking, represent her in pur-
suing her IDEA claims against the School District, they may pursue
their own identical claims, in their own right."' 9' Therefore, the
court concluded that "[t] he fair and equitable resolution to the prob-
lem pointed out by the School District's motion to dismiss is, then,
simply to recognize that Sasha's parents are effectively proceeding on
their own behalf and pursuing their own co-extensive rights under
the IDEA."'194 The court denied the school district's motion to dismiss
and substituted Sasha's parents as plaintiffs, without requiring any
further motions, because "Sasha's parents are actual parties in inter-
est (and might well be barred from representing Sasha in this pro-
ceeding), and because their rights under the IDEA are co-extensive
with Sasha's."'
95
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida took the second approach in L.J. v. Broward County School
Board.'96 In L.J., a mother asserted multiple allegations on behalf of
herself and her son against her son's school, including the failure to
provide her son with a FAPE.'97 The school district motioned to dis-
miss the complaint, arguing that the Eleventh Circuit maintains a ban
m9 Id. at *1-2.
192 Id. at *2.
193 Id.
19 Alexandra R., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66091, at *2-3.
195 Id. at *5. Similar to Alexandra R, a mother submitted an application to the
U.S. District Court for the District of NewJersey for pro bono counsel for representa-
tion in an IDEA action. Montclair Bd. of Educ. v. M.W.D., No. 05-3516 (DMC), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46212, at *1 (D.N.J.June 26, 2007). Although the mother listed her
name and her son's name, the court considered both parent and child to be inter-
ested parties in the action and allowed the application to be considered on behalf of
the mother and child. Id. at *4. Ultimately, the mother's application was denied be-
cause it did not meet the Third Circuit's guidelines for appointing pro bono repre-
sentation to an indigent applicant. Id. at *4-6. However, the court indicated that
either mother or child may reapply for pro bono counsel in the future. Id. at *5.
19 No. 06-61282-CIV-MOORE/GARBER, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41925 (S.D. Fla.
June 8, 2007).197 Id. at *1-2.
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against parents representing a child's rights.'98 The court acknowl-
edged that Winkelman did not address whether a parent may litigate a
child's claims under IDEA and held that "[b]ecause the Supreme
Court did not make that ruling, the Eleventh Circuit rule prohibiting
such representation controls."""
The court determined that the mother may not represent her
child's rights and dismissed the child's claims without prejudice.2 0
The mother could litigate violations of her parental rights, but the
son must have an attorney to litigate his claims. 20 ' The judge noted
that if the son were to "obtain an attorney to represent him in the fu-
ture, he may file a motion requesting to join this action and to amend
the complaint to add his claims. 2 2 Ultimately, the court granted the
school district's motion to dismiss the child's claims and granted the
mother leave to file an amended complaint that clearly alleges viola-
203tions of the mother's rights.
If moved by a school district to dismiss a pro se claim that asserts
violations of a parent's and a child's rights, courts should take one of
the two aforementioned approaches to foster faster resolution of the
IDEA case. Faster resolution is beneficial for families, school districts,
and Congress. First, families will not have to expend time and forgo
potential work commitments. Second, children will not have to re-
198 Id. at *2-3. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that
"parents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child's behalf-
because it helps to ensure that children rightfully entitled to legal relief are not de-
prived of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents." Id. at *5 (quoting De-
vine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1997)).
199 Id.
2oo Id. at *5-6.
201 Id.
202 L.J. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41925, at *17.
203 Id. at *16-17. Following the court's decision in L.J, in a subsequent case, the
mother filed an amended complaint in which she alleged violations of IDEA, that the
school district illegally discriminated against her son due to his disability, and that
the school district knowingly put her son's well-being, safety, and quality of life at
risk. N.N.J. v. Broward County Sch. Bd., No. 06-61282-CIV-MOORE/GARBER, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78709, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2007). The school district motioned
to dismiss the amended complaint asserting that the mother failed to exhaust IDEA's
administrative remedies in regards to the retaliation and discrimination issues. Id. at
*3. Additionally, the school district argued "that the portions of each Count which
seek to enforce the rights of L.J. should be dismissed because in the Eleventh Circuit
a parent cannot represent her child pro se." Id. The court dismissed the mother's
retaliation and discrimination claims without prejudice for failing to file a separate
administrative complaint for the retaliation issue pursuant to IDEA. Id. at *5-6. Ad-
ditionally, the court dismissed without prejudice the claims brought on her son's be-
half, specifically the claim that her son was discriminated against because of his disa-
bility. Id. at *7. The court again noted that the mother could continue to litigate her
IDEA rights but that her son would need representation to assert his claims. Id.
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main in educational settings that do not meet their needs. Third,
school districts will not have to expend financial resources to file ex-
tra motions or to fund additional compensatory education. Finally,
federal tax dollars will be spent on litigating the substance of whether
the school district violated IDEA, rather than on procedural motions
to dismiss or to fund additional compensatory education incurred as
a result of drawn out litigation.0 4 These benefits are particularly per-
suasive considering the attention that Winkelman has received.
Winkelman has received notoriety from multiple press outlets,
which have quoted special education experts forecasting an increase
in the number of parents prosecuting violations of IDEA pro se.205
Dr. Richard S. Vacca, Editor of the Commonwealth Educational Poli-
cy Institute Education Law Newsletter, warned that "public school of-
ficials and administrators can expect to experience an increase in le-
gal and policy issues involving parental rights and legal
representation of children covered under IDEA.",0 6 An advocate
from the National ARD / IEP Advocates commented, "I'm advising my
people, if they can't afford counsel, to go for it; go pro se.'2°v There
is a strong likelihood that federal courts will see an increase in par-
ents prosecuting IDEA claims pro se; accordingly, courts should fol-
low one of the two approaches to move the parties toward resolving
the substance of the IDEA claim, as initially intended by Congress.
B. Ambiguity #2: Attorney-Parents May Be Able to Recover Attorney
Fees if They Are the Prevailing Party
Before Winkelman, lower courts retained differing views on the
status of the representative relationship between an attorney-parent
and a child. In Winkelman, the Court did not address the status of at-
torney-parents representing a child. Now that parents have distinct
rights under IDEA, the determination of whether an attorney-parent
prosecutes an IDEA claim pro se, not pro se, or as an agent is more
complicated. Whether attorney-parents may recover attorney fees if
they are a prevailing party likely turns on the status of the relation-
Congress has recognized that educating a child with disabilities costs "effective-
ly double what it costs to normally educate a child in this country." 150 CONG. REC.
S5331 (daily ed. May 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
205 But see Walsh, supra note 18, at 18-19 (reporting that "[a]dvocates for parents
and children in special education said they doubted that federal courthouses would
be overrun by parent cases").
2W Potential Issues to Watch in the 2007-2008 School Year, CEPI EDuc. L. NEWSL.
(Commonwealth Educational Policy Institute), June 20, 2007, at 1-10, available at
http://www.cepionline.org/newsletter/2006-2007/2007-JunePotential lssues.html.
7 Radcliffe, supra note 17, at B6.
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ship between parent and child. However, whether a prevailing lay
parent is entitled to attorney fees likely turns on the legislative history
of the fee-shifting provision.
1. Attorney-Parents Prosecuting Claims of a Child
As a result of the holding in Winkelman, the agency theory prof-
fered by the United States District Court for the District of Georgia is
persuasive and should be adopted by other courts.0 8 The agency
theory defined by the Supreme Court of the United States contem-
plates representation of another individual by the attorney: "a legal
agent qualified to act for suitors and defendants in legal proceed-
ings. 20 9 The United States District Court for the District of Georgia
predicated its recognition of an agency relationship between an at-
torney-parent and a child upon the separate legal status of a parent
and a child under IDEA. 20 The Court in Winkelman confirmed that
parents and children retain independent stakes in procedural and
substantive rights under IDEA.21   The independent legal status of
parents under IDEA provides support for courts to characterize the
relationship between attorney-parent and child as an agency relation-
ship to allow prevailing attorney-parents to recover attorney fees
when prosecuting the claims of a child.
In discussing the recognized agency relationship, the United
States District Court for the District of Georgia reasoned that attor-
ney-parents may be entitled to attorney fees because a state bar asso-
ciation's rules of professional conduct may deter a parent from acting
in an unprofessional manner.2  That consideration can still be valid-
ly applied to the attorney fee-shifting provision after Winkelman.
A state bar's ethical and procedural rules, combined with the in-
tricacies of the attorney fee-shifting provision, will serve as an external
check to ensure that a child is represented in a professional manner.
Any failure by an attorney to represent a claim in a professional man-
ner may be taken into consideration by the court when determining
the amount of fees to award a prevailing party.2
See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
M Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 n.6 (1991) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW
CoLLEGiATE DICIONARY 73 (1975)).
20 Matthew V. v. Dekalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337 (N.D. Ga.
2003) (noting that the separate status of parents and children "supports the conclu-
sion that a parent-attorney performs in the 'agency relationship' contemplated by
Kay" (citing Kay, 499 U.S. at 435-36 (1991))).
211 Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 531 (2007).
22 Matthew V, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
213 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3) (F) (2006).
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A court considers multiple factors when determining the
amount of fees to award, which serve only to compensate the profes-
sional and effectuate an efficient resolution of claims. The court
considers the prevailing party's application for fees, but also com-
pares the attorney's hourly rate to that of a special education attorney
in that jurisdiction with similar experience to ensure that the rate is
not exorbitant.2 14 Additionally, the court considers the attorney's ex-
perience when looking at the number of hours the attorney submit-
ted for litigating the claims.215 Courts have awarded less than a pre-
vailing party attorney has applied for when the court deems that the
fee or the hours spent litigating the claims were not reasonable.1
Thus, an excellent criminal defense attorney who chooses to
represent her child's IDEA claims would not likely be able to com-
mand the hourly rates that she would normally receive. Moreover, if
an attorney acted in any unprofessional manner, the court is within
its discretion to completely withhold attorney fees."' Furthermore,
attorney-parents may have a school district's fees shifted to them if
they bring a suit that is frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda-
tion.2" Therefore, permitting fee-recovery would encourage an at-
torney-parent to litigate in a professional and efficient manner and
would simultaneously undermine the extension of Kay to relation-
ships which are not pro se.219
An attorney-parent is also encouraged to represent a child's
claim effectively and efficiently because of the unavoidable opportu-
nity costs involved in representing a child, rather than a client.220 Re-
presentation of an IDEA case will take an attorney-parent away from
representing paying clients. An attorney-parent will have to reorgan-
ize professional endeavors to accommodate a child's litigation. At-
torney-parents will, of course, want to zealously advocate for a child,
but they will also have to contend with lost opportunity costs that may
result from forgoing the advancement of current cases and from hav-
ing to turn down potential clients.
Attorney-parents may also have to contend, like all parents look-
ing to prosecute an IDEA violation, with the reality that there is a sig-
214 Id. § 1415(i)(3)(F)(ii).
25 Id. § 1415(i) (3) (F) (iii).
21 P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., No. 02-1351 (FLW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29289, at *30-39 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2007).
217 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i) (3) (B) (i), (i)(3)(F).
218 Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I)-(III).
219 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
M Matthew V. v. Dekalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1338 (N.D. Ga.
2003).
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nificant shortage of competent lawyers willing to litigate complex and
costly IDEA claims. The petitioners in Winkelman discussed this
shortage, noting that the "majority of lawyers in private practice in
the United States work in law firms that represent institutions, not
people."21 Additionally, amici in Winkelman presented statistics to il-
lustrate the severity of the shortage: Maine has six special education
attorneys, Alabama has five, Arizona has two known private attorneys
who will accept referrals, and Alaska has only one private attorney ac-
222cepting IDEA cases. In some instances an attorney-parent may
search for a special education attorney to no avail.
If a parent is able to find an attorney in the jurisdiction, hiring
an attorney may nevertheless be financially unobtainable, even for an
attorney-parent. IDEA cases come at a high cost to litigate22 3 and of-
ten endure years of litigation. The total cost of litigating an IDEA
claim may range from $10,000 to more than $100,000.224 These prac-
tical realities may leave an attorney-parent with only the option of
representing his child.
Based on the Court's acknowledgment that parents and children
retain independent and enforceable rights under IDEA,' courts
should recognize the relationship between an attorney-parent and a
child as an agency relationship and, in turn, permit a prevailing at-
torney-parent to recover attorney fees. Attorney-parents have mul-
tiple incentives to litigate a child's claims efficiently and effectively.
Conversely, as noted by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Georgia, state rules of professional conduct may permit a
child, an alternate parent, or school district to assert improper repre-
sentation by an attorney. 26 Therefore, outside checks exist to assure
that a child is not harmed by inappropriate representation by an at-
torney-parent. Permitting prevailing attorney-parents the ability to
recover attorney fees will help ensure that violations of IDEA are
221 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at 14-15 (quoting David C. Via-
deck, In re Arons: The Plight of the "Unrich " in Obtaining Legal Services, in LEGAL ETHICS:
LAW STORIEs 255, 258 (Deborah L. Rhode & DavidJ. Luban eds., 2005)).
Brief of Autism Society of America et al. as Amici Curiae In Support of Peti-
tioners at 9-10, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (No. 05-
983), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1318.
223 Special education lawyers generally charge between $150 and $450 an hour.
Brief for Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc., supra note 9, at 9 n.4.
224 Id.
225 Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 531 (2007).
226 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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prosecuted and help assure that a child receives an appropriate edu-
cation. 127
2. Attorney-Parents and Lay Parents Prosecuting Parental
Rights Pro Se
The agency relationship cannot be recognized in the context
where an attorney-parent or a lay parent prosecutes parental rights
pro se. The Court in Kay explained that the term "attorney" in the
fee-shifting provision in § 1988, which is almost identical to that in
IDEA, "assumes an agency relationship, and it seems likely that Con-
gress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate
for an award under § 1988., 228 An attorney-parent or a lay parent
who prosecutes a parental right that is his or her own cannot form an
agency relationship because there are not two individuals, as con-
templated by an agency relationship.2 2 9 Therefore, it is not likely that
courts could use the agency theory to allow attorney-parents or lay
parents prosecuting IDEA claims pro se to recover. However, this is
not necessarily problematic for an attorney-parent because parents
and children retain the same rights and remedies under IDEA.230
Thus, the attorney-parent can choose to prosecute the claims of the
child, instead of prosecuting parental rights pro se, in order to create
the agency relationship necessary to permit the award of attorney
fees. 23' However, lay parents will likely never be permitted to recover
attorney fees because lay parents are precluded from prosecuting
claims of a child,2 2 which would prevent them from forming the
agency relationship through which attorney fees may be awarded.233
27 Cf Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore County, 165 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1998)
(noting IDEA's attorney fee provisions "should be read to encourage parents to ob-
tain independent legal services" because parents do not need statutory fees to en-
courage them to prosecute IDEA violations to ensure their children receive an ade-
quate education).
228 Kayv. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1991).
22 See id. at 436 n.6.
230 Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 531.
231 However, attorney-parents should be cautious not to assert violations of per-
sonal parental rights at the same time. An attorney-parent would effectively be
representing themselves pro se, while simultaneously representing the rights of the
child. This could cause a court to question whether there was an actual agency rela-
tionship, in which the attorney-parent was vindicating the rights of the child. Addi-
tionally, it may undermine the ability of the child or another parent to sue the attor-
ney-parent for malpractice, a safeguard upon which an agency relationship may be
recognized to permit the recovery of attorney fees.
2 See generally Alexandra R. v. Brookline Sch. Dist., No. 06-cv-215-SM, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 66091 (D.N.H. Sept. 6, 2007); Bell v. Anderson Cmty. Sch., No. 1:07-cv-
00936-JDT-WTL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57428 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 2007); L.J. v. Bro-
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C. Ambiguity #3: Parents May Have Attorney Fees Shifted to Them
Under Both § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II) and § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III)
IDEA contains two attorney fee-shifting provisions that allow a
school district or state educational agency to collect fees from a par-
ent or the attorney of the parent.2 3 4 Parents and attorneys are held to
different standards under these provisions.23 ' Under §
1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II), an attorney may be liable for the attorney fees of
a school district or state educational agency if the attorney initiates a
due process claim or subsequent action that is "frivolous, unreasona-
ble, or without foundation" or if the attorney continues to litigate "af-
ter the litigation clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation. 23 6 Comparatively, under § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (III), a par-
ent or the attorney of a parent may be liable if a due process complaint
or subsequent action "was presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the
cost of litigation., 237 Winkelman did not shed light on the capacity in
which lay pro se parents or attorney-parents prosecute IDEA claims.
The Court's omission creates ambiguity over whether lay parents and
attorney-parents are "parents" or "attorneys" under IDEA's fee-
shifting statutes.
While the statute expressly states that an attorney or a parent
may be liable to an opposing party that can establish one of the ele-
ments in § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (III), it is unclear whether parents prose-
cuting IDEA claims fall under the scope of § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II).
Since § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II) refers to "an attorney of a parent," at-
torney-parents likely fall within its scope, regardless of whether they
are prosecuting an IDEA claim vindicating the rights of a child or
personal parental rights. However, it is unclear whether a lay parent
may be liable for a school district or state educational agency's attor-
ney fees under § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II).
The legislative history of §§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-(III) reveals
that Congress fashioned the new attorney fee provisions 2  after the
provision developed by the Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment
ward County Sch. Bd., No. 06-61282-CIV-MOORE/GARBER, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
41925 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2007).
233 Kay, 499 U.S. at 435-36.
234 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II)-(III) (2006).
235 See id.
236 Id. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II).
237 Id. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (III).
238 150 CONG. REc. S5250, 5349 (daily ed. May 12, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Gregg).
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Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.'" In Christiansburg,
the Court determined that defendants may recover attorney fees
when the plaintiff's case is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foun-
dation," even if the plaintiff does not subjectively bring the claim in
bad faith. 40 Congress explained that the addition of the provisions
was intended to deter the limited situations where a parent brought a
frivolous suit, or continued to litigate after the case clearly became
frivolous, or where a parent harassed a school district by filing a me-
ritless complaint and subsequently dropped it. 41 The standard that
school districts or state educational agencies must establish is very
strict and "it would still be to the advantage of school districts to settle
all but the most egregious, frivolous complaints. 242  Nevertheless,
Congress felt it was important to add the provision because defend-
ing frivolous suits "drains funds away from needed services for other
disabled children., 242  Congress emphasized that a legitimate IDEA
dispute would not fall within the scope of these new provisions, and
would not trigger fee-shifting.244
To trigger fee-shifting under § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II), a school dis-
trict or state educational agency must be deemed a prevailing party
by the court. 4' Additionally, the defendant must show that the un-
derlying claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda-
tion. ,2 1  When considering the defendant's motion for fees, the
Christiansburg Court cautioned:
[I]t is important that a district court resist the understandable
temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, be-
cause a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have
been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight
logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom
can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success .... Even
when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at
the outset, a Party may have an entirely reasonable ground for
bringing suit.
239 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434
U.S. 412 (1978).
240 Id. at 421.
241 150 CONG. REC. S5250, 5349 (daily ed. May 12, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Gregg).
242 Id. (statement of Sen. Grassley).
243 Id.
244 Id. at 5352 (statement of Sen. Enzi).
245 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II) (2006).
246 Id.
247 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434
U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978).
1016 [Vol. 39:981
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1016 2009
COMMENT
Moreover, § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II) allows a court discretion in deter-
mining whether to award fees and discretion over the amount
awarded to the school district.
248
Prior to Winkelman, courts were reluctant to award fees under §
1415 (i) (3) (B) (i) (II). A district court has only shifted fees against the
attorney of a parent in one instance. In R. W v. Georgia Department of
Education, an attorney for a parent filed an IDEA claim against the
Georgia Board of Education, the Georgia Department of Education,
and the Georgia State Superintendent, averring that they "aided and
abetted denials of the due process rights of disabled children in cer-
tain administrative hearings held to enforce IDEA rights." '49 Howev-
er, precedent in the jurisdiction revealed two prior cases which ex-
plained that the named defendants in KW. were not proper parties
to such a suit.10 More specifically, the prosecuting attorney in R W.
had prosecuted those two cases and therefore "knew that no legal
foundation existed" to include the defendants in the complaint. 5'
The court determined that a shift of attorney fees was appropriate "in
light of clear existing precedent, the absence of any persuasive justifi-
cation from Plaintiff's counsel, and the obvious knowledge on the
part of Plaintiffs counsel that some of her claims would be subject to
dismissal."2
Although § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II) expressly states that a school
district or state educational agency may seek fees "against the attor-
ney of a parent," it is likely that the scope of § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II)
will be judicially extended to parents prosecuting IDEA claims pro se.
Courts have applied the standard developed in Christiansburg to pro
se litigants in § 1988 claims, § 1983 claims, and Title VII claims."3
Therefore, should a parent prosecuting an IDEA claim pro se file a
claim that is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, the par-
ent may be held liable for the school district's or state educational
agency's attorney fees. However, courts have noted that pro se plain-
tiffs should be afforded some leniency when determining whether at-
torney fees should be shifted to defendants. 254 "The fact that a [pro
sel plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficientjus-
248 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II).
249 R.W. v. Georgia Dep't of Educ., No. 1:07-cv-535-WSD, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74228, *2-3. (N.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2007).
250 Id. at *2.
251 Id. at "18-19.
252 Id. at *19.
253 Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980).
254 Id. at 15.
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tification for the assessment of fees." 5 Moreover, in the context of a
Title VII claim, the Court has noted that " [t] o take the further step of
assessing attorney's fees against plaintiffs simply because they do not
finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most lit-
igation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the
vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII. ' '256 Similar to
Title VII, IDEA relies on parents to utilize procedural safeguards in
order to enforce the provisions of IDEA. 25 '7 Following precedent set
by Title VII, in regard to attorney fee-shifting, courts would likely be
cautious in applying § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II) so as not to chill the en-
forcement of IDEA.
Courts should follow precedent in extending the Christiansburg
standard to pro se parents prosecuting IDEA claims. Legislative his-
tory supports the notion that pro se parents are within the scope of §
1415(i) (3) (B) (i)(II). When Congress amended IDEA to add the fee-
shifting provisions, multiple legislators noted that they supported
adding the provisions to specifically target parents who bring frivol-
ous or improper lawsuits. 58 To illustrate the danger of frivolous law-
suits, Senator Judd Gregg discussed a school district that spent over
$154,000 to defend itself against seven due process requests within
two years from one parent.259 Another school district spent $195,000
litigating a parent's fifteen due process and fair hearing requests over
a six-year span. 260 Requiring § 1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II) to apply to pro se
parents will help assure that federal IDEA funds go toward special
education services and legitimate IDEA claims rather than frivolous
or unreasonable claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the decision in Winkelman was arguably a victory for par-
ents, it simultaneously created problematic ambiguities in key provi-
sions of IDEA's statutory text. Following the Court's recognition of
parental rights, the Court failed to discuss how the recognition would
affect standing and the attorney fee-shifting provisions. That failure
necessitates a cautious "wait and see" approach before calling Winkel-
man a major victory for parents.
255 Id. at 14.
2% Id. at 14-15.
257 See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006).
25 See, e.g., 150 CONG. REc. S5250, 5349 (daily ed. May 12, 2004) (statement of
Sen. Gregg).
259 Id.
260 Id. at 5350.
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Courts should respond to the ambiguities in IDEA triggered by
Winkelman by clarifying the scope of the decision's effect on IDEA
claims. Courts should clarify whether a parent may represent a
child's claim, whether an attorney-parent or lay parent who prevails is
permitted to recover attorney fees, and to what standard attorney-
parents and lay parents will be held when a prevailing school district
seeks to recover attorney fees. How courts reconcile these ambigui-
ties will ultimately determine whether Winkelman is a major victory for
parents.
The first ambiguity should be resolved by substituting a child's
name on a complaint with only the parents' names or by dismissing
any claims asserted on behalf of a child and allowing parents the op-
portunity to amend the complaint. This course of action helps en-
sure that courts focus on the substance of the complaint, whether the
child received a FAPE, rather than the name listed on the complaint.
If courts take one of the two approaches, IDEA claims will be resolved
faster. If a parent prevails, a child will receive faster access to the ap-
propriate educational environment and will receive any compensato-
ry education necessary. In this regard, Winkelman is beneficial for
families seeking to prosecute an IDEA claim pro se because the family
may assert that parental rights were violated in order to quickly liti-
gate the substance of the dispute.
The second ambiguity should be resolved by permitting attor-
ney-parents to recover attorney fees for prevailing in prosecuting the
claims of a child. Under Winkelman's holding parents now have in-
dependent and enforceable rights. Therefore, courts may recognize
that attorney-parents are in an agency relationship with the child and,
in turn, permit the recovery of fees to a prevailing attorney-parent.
Unfortunately, the agency relationship cannot be extended to attor-
ney-parents or lay parents prosecuting parental rights pro se because
the relationship does not involve the representation of another indi-
vidual, as contemplated by an agency relationship. Should courts in-
terpret the ambiguity as argued, attorney-parents will have the oppor-
tunity to collect fees for a prevailing prosecution. This would remove
cost barriers from an attorney-parent contemplating the prosecution
of a child's claim. Interpreting IDEA in that way would be a victory
for parents, but would be limited in scope to only attorney-parents
representing the claims of a child.
The third ambiguity should be resolved by availing both attor-
ney-parents and lay-parents of both of the provisions in IDEA that al-
low a school district to recover attorney fees. The legislative history of
the adoption of the provisions supports the extension of §
20091 1019
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1415(i) (3) (B) (i) (II). Parents and advocates may be upset with such
an interpretation; however, the provisions serve as a check against fri-
volous, unreasonable, and unsupported claims. Such claims hurt all
families with disabilities because school districts must use funds to de-
fend their delivery of educational services that could have otherwise
been used to deliver special education services.
Ensuring that IDEA is unambiguous and works effectively is of
significant importance to the future of our nation. Young children,
who receive appropriate services at a young age, require fewer special
education services later in their education, are held back less fre-
quently, and maintain higher test scores than children who do not
receive the appropriate interventions and accommodations."'
Therefore, when children receive appropriate services early in their
lives, as intended by IDEA, they will be able to contribute to our na-
tion and will need less support and services from the government as
adults. Courts must properly interpret IDEA's provisions to ensure
that children receive the services necessary for them to lead meaning-
ful and productive lives.
261 F.A. Campbell et al., Early Childhood Education: Young Adult Outcomes from the Ab-
ecedarian Project, in 6 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL Sci. 2, 42-57 (2002).
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